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INTRODUCTION 
 
A court may, in its discretion, award a prevailing party its 
attorney’s fees in an action brought under certain civil rights statutes, 
including, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 Although 
this statutory language gives courts the discretion to award fees, courts 
have held that a plaintiff should recover attorney’s fees if she has 
prevailed, unless circumstances exist that would make the award 
unjust.2 Private litigants enforce civil rights statutes in a vastly greater 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., English and Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign. I would like to acknowledge Professor Hal Morris, Justin Nemunaitis, 
and Michael Ko for their assistance and guidance in writing this note. 
1 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000) reads: 
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to 
this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the 
United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private 
individual. 
2 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citing S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 
at 4 (1976)) (discussing fee shifting in the context of the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976); see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 
1
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proportion than the government, and fee-shifting has enabled 
individuals seeking judicial relief to overcome prohibitively expensive 
attorney’s fees in order to vindicate their civil rights, even if a case 
may not otherwise appear lucrative to an attorney.3 Thus, fee shifting 
statutes are an integral component of enforcing and vindicating certain 
rights. Courts have grappled over the issue of whether one has 
“prevailed” according to these statutes. What seems like a 
straightforward issue has instead developed into a voluminous and 
somewhat murky body of case law addressing who should be 
considered a prevailing party and what legal standard should apply4; 
therefore, litigants need and deserve guidance on this otherwise 
elusive standard. 
In general, a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees is reviewed to 
determine first whether the party prevailed and second whether the 
fees awarded were reasonable. In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate 
she has “prevailed,” the Supreme Court requires the plaintiff to have 
obtained: (1) an enforceable judgment against the defendant on the 
merits of her claim (2) that directly benefits the plaintiff at the time of 
judgment.5 In Farrar v. Hobby, the Court noted that the degree of 
                                                                                                                   
U.S. 400, 402-403 (1968) (per curiam) (stating that a party that obtains an injunction 
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, a court should ordinarily award the 
plaintiff attorney’s fees absent special circumstances). The Court has often 
interpreted fee-shifting provisions in the various civil rights statutes consistently 
with each other. See Henley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7; Buckhannon Bd. v. West Virginia 
Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001). Therefore, this 
Note will not draw any distinction between case law interpreting different fee 
shifting statutes. 
3 Catherine R. Albiston and Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on 
Civil Rights: The Empircal Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1089-90 (2007) (while state and federal governments 
enforce certain individual’s rights, more than 90 percent of enforcement actions 
under civil rights statutes are initiated by private parties). 
4 Matthew B. Tenney, When Does a Party Prevail?: A Proposed “Third-
Circuit-Plus” Test for Judicial Imprimatur, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 449 (2005) 
(noting that Supreme Court has not formulated clear policy guidelines for the 
prevailing party inquiry, particularly regarding the sufficient judicial imprimatur 
needed to satisfy the Court’s prevailing party standard). 
5 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112 (1992). 
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success a plaintiff was awarded weighs into the court’s determination 
of what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee, not whether he would be 
considered a prevailing party.6 The Supreme Court noted that even if a 
plaintiff “formally prevails” at trial, she should not be awarded 
attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, such as where a plaintiff fails 
to establish an element to his claim for compensatory damages and 
receives nominal damages instead.7 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit applied the prevailing party standard 
in Karraker v. Rent-A-Center to determine whether a plaintiff class 
that had obtained injunctive relief against an employer was a 
prevailing party despite no indication in the record suggesting that any 
member of the class was still employed with the defendant at the time 
the injunction was ordered.8 Recognizing that it was a “close 
question,” the court concluded that the plaintiffs had received a 
“valuable benefit” from the injunction, but did not address how the 
potentially non-existent employer-employee relationship should factor 
into the inquiry, if at all.9 
This Note will argue that the Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded 
correctly in Karraker II by holding that the plaintiffs prevailed; 
however, it further argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a per 
se rule stating that a plaintiff’s enforceable final judgment is sufficient 
to confer upon a plaintiff “prevailing party” so as to avoid the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis altogether. Part I will discuss the traditional bar to 
awarding prevailing litigants their attorney fees, the formulation of the 
“private attorney general” exception, and the Supreme Court’s 
formulation of the “prevailing party” standard. Part II will introduce 
Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, including the relevant facts, the majority’s 
holding, and its reasoning. Part III will analyze the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                 
6 Id. at 114 (noting that the “most critical factor” in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee award “is the degree of success obtained”) (citing Hensley, 
461 U.S. at 436). 
7 Id. at 115 (internal quotations omitted). 
8 Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. (Karraker II), 492 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2007). 
Judge Terrence Evans authored the majority opinion in which Judge Ann Claire 
Williams joined. Judge Joel Flaum voiced his dissent in a separate opinion. 
9 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898-899. 
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holding in light of the Supreme Court’s formulation of the prevailing 
party standard. Part III then argues that the Supreme Court should 
adopt a per se rule stating that civil rights plaintiffs who obtain a 
permanent injunction are automatically prevailing parties within the 
meaning of the various fee shifting provision statutes.  
 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. The “American Rule” and the “Private Attorney General” Theory 
 
In the United States, private litigants are generally responsible to 
bear their respective costs associated with litigation, including 
attorneys’ fees, absent statutory authorization stating otherwise.10 
Courts dubbed this principle the “American rule”—distinguishing it 
primarily from the “English rule” in which the losing party ordinarily 
must pay the winning party the costs it incurred in the litigation.11 
While the precise legal origin of the “American rule” is debatable, 12 
the Supreme Court declared its general disinclination to award 
attorneys’ fees to a winning party as a matter of course early on in 
American jurisprudence.13 Despite the “American rule,” courts carved 
out several exceptions to the general prohibition on recovering 
attorneys’ fees from a losing party.14  
                                                 
10 See Daniel Steuer, Another Brick in the Wall: Attorney’s Fees for the Civil 
Rights Litigant After Buckhannon, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 53, 53 (2004) 
(“prevailing litigants typically do not receive an award of attorney’s fees from the 
losing party . . .”). 
11 Id.; David A. Root, Student Author, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: 
Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and the “English 
Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 584-85 (2004). 
12 EIU Group v. Citibank Delaware, Inc., 429 F.Supp.2d 367, 370 (D. Mass 
2006), rev’d on other grounds.  
13 See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 306, *1 (1796) (deciding that 
counsel’s fees awarded to a winning litigant should not be allowed in accordance 
with the general practice in the United States; intimating that this principle could be 
modified by statute). 
14 F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. U.S. For the Use of Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 
U.S. 116, 129 (1974). One exception applies when a losing party has acted “in bad 
4
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One such exception was the “private attorney general” theory, 
which was developed from language found in a Supreme Court case 
addressing the fee-shifting statute in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 In 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the trial court should limit an award of attorney’s 
fees to the extent that the losing defendants had advanced certain 
defenses merely to prolong the litigation in bad faith.16 The Court held 
that the trial court was not required to limit its award of attorneys’ fees 
as such because the purpose behind the fee-shifting provision was to 
encourage individuals to seek judicial relief for racial discrimination.17 
A plaintiff that obtains an injunction under Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act18 to correct prohibited discriminatory conduct does so not only as 
a private litigant, but also as a private attorney general vindicating a 
Congressional policy of importance.19 The Court further explained that 
the purpose of the fee-shifting provision in the Civil Rights Act was to 
encourage private suits so as to ensure broad compliance with a law 
that Congress considers a high priority.20 
In response to the Supreme Court’s “private attorney general” 
rationale, lower courts soon extended the concept to justify an award 
of fees absent statutory authorization; a distinct issue from the one the 
                                                                                                                   
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. (citing Vaughan v. 
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)). Another exception applies where a successful party 
has obtained a substantial benefit for a class, and the award of attorney’s fees acts to 
“spread the cost proportionately among the members of the benefited class. F.D. 
Rich, 417 U.S. at 129-30 (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973)); Mills v. Electric 
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)). The Supreme Court has also held that courts 
may award attorney’s fees for “willful disobedience of a court order . . . as part of 
the fine to be levied on the defendant.” Aleyska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The 
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975). 
15 See Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees and Equal Access to the 
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 666-667 (1974) (discussing development of the 
“private attorney general” theory based on language in Newman, 390 U.S. at 400). 
16 Newman, 390 U.S. at 401. 
17 Id. at 401-402. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2000). 
19 Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.  
20 Id. at 401-402. 
5
Guerra: Determining Whether Plaintiff Prevailed is a "Close Question"—But
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 63
Court addressed in Newman.21 By extending the theory absent a 
statute, the courts, in effect, carved out an exception to the “American 
rule.”22 Courts based this exception on the Newman Court’s rationale 
that an individual that obtains relief “vindicating a policy that 
Congress considered of the highest priority” acts as a “private attorney 
general”23 and should typically recover attorney’s fees unless 
circumstances exist making such recovery unjust.24 Based on the 
newly carved out exception, courts began awarding attorney’s fees 
absent statutory authorization to private parties that obtained success 
under legislation that depended, at least in part, on private 
enforcement—most notably in the field of civil rights.25 
The Supreme Court abrogated the application of the private 
attorney general exception to the American rule.26 In Aleyska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Society, Justice White, writing for the 
majority, stated it is solely within Congress’ powers to statutorily 
authorize an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.27 Justice 
White recognized that, although exceptions exist that allow courts to 
award fees without statutory authorization, the private attorney general 
theory was not among them.28 While the Court recognized that 
Congress had added fee-shifting provisions in civil rights statutes 
                                                 
21 Comment, supra note 15, at 666-67. 
22 Albiston and Nielsen, supra note 3, at 1093. 
23 Newman, 390 U.S. at 402. 
24 See e.g. Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying private 
attorney general theory absent a fee shifting statute to a § 1982 action); Lee v. 
Southern Homes Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1970) (§ 1982 action). 
25 See e.g. Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee, 429 F.2d 
at 146-47; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 102 (N.D. Cal. 1972), abrogated 
by Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
26 Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 
(1975). 
27 Id. at 271. The plaintiffs in Aleyska were suing under the Mineral Leasing 
Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. Id. at 242-43. Neither statute authorized courts to award 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. Id. at 245.  
28 Id. at 271 (stating “it is not for us to invade the legislature’s province by 
redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested”).  
6
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based on the private attorney general theory, it noted that Congress’ 
use of theory could not be “construed as a grant of authority to the 
Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against nonstatutory 
allowances to the prevailing party and to award attorneys fees 
whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular 
statute important enough to warrant the award.”29  
 
B. The Prevailing Party Standard: The Americans with Disabilities Act 
and Other Civil Rights Statutes 
 
1. Supreme Court Precedent 
 
In the wake of Aleyska’s pronouncement that courts should not 
fashion a private attorney general exception to the “American rule,” 
Congress increasingly included fee-shifting provisions in selected 
legislation.30 For example, when Congress enacted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, it included a fee-shifting provision.31 
Although Supreme Court case law interpreting the fee-shifting 
provision in the ADA is sparse due to its relatively recent enactment, 
the Supreme Court has guided lower courts to interpret the ADA fee-
shifting provision consistently with the nearly identical provisions 
found in the Civil Right Act of 1964,32 the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1975,33 and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards 
                                                 
29 Id. at 263. 
30 Jeffery S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The 
Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 301 (1990). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 12205; see supra note 1. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the 
costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as 
a private person.”). 
33 42 U.S.C § 1973l(e) (2000) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce the 
voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party… a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable 
expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs.”). 
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Act of 1976.34 As a result, the case law interpreting fee-shifting 
provisions in civil rights statutes has been read consistently with one 
another; therefore, there is no need to distinguish the language in the 
fee-shifting provisions.  
A party seeking attorney’s fees must cross a threshold to be 
considered a prevailing party, as defined by fee-shifting statutes.35 For 
a plaintiff to meet the threshold, he must show that he “succeeded on 
any significant issue in the litigation which achieve[d] some of the 
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”36 The “touchstone of the 
prevailing party inquiry” is that the relationship between the parties 
must have been materially altered “in a manner which Congress 
sought to promote in the fee statute.”37 In Farrar v. Hobby, the 
Supreme Court clarified the standard by stating that a plaintiff 
prevailed if he obtains “actual relief on the merits of his claim [that] 
materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by 
modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the 
plaintiff.”38 
The Supreme Court previously addressed whether a plaintiff that 
obtains a favorable judgment from the litigation will be considered a 
prevailing party despite not enjoying a direct benefit from the 
judgment. In Rhodes v. Stewart, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
two plaintiffs that had obtained a final, favorable judgment on the 
merits were prevailing parties, even though neither plaintiff benefited 
                                                 
34 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party… reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”); see also 
Buckhannon v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598, 
602-603, n.4 (2001); cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, n.7 (1983) (per 
curiam) (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, n.4 (1980) (per curiam)) 
(noting that the legislative history of § 1988 demonstrated Congress’s desire for 
courts to apply the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees that had been used in 
conjunction with the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
35 Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Indp. School Dist., 489 U.S. 
782, 791-792 (1989).  
36 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 
278-279 (1st Cir. 1978)). 
37 Garland, 489 U.S. at 792-93. 
38506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992) (emphasis added).  
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from the judgment at the time it was entered.39 The plaintiffs were two 
inmates that challenged a prison’s denial of their First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights when it refused to allow them to subscribe to 
magazines.40 The district court entered declaratory judgment in the 
inmates’ favor declaring that the prison had violated the plaintiffs’ civil 
rights; however, by the time the court entered the judgment, one 
inmate had already passed away while the other inmate had been 
released from prison.41 After the declaratory judgment and the 
plaintiffs’ release, the prison modified its policies to abide by the 
parameters set forth in the district court’s judgment.42 The Court held 
that the plaintiffs had not prevailed because neither of the inmates 
could have benefited from the judgment due to the release of one 
inmate and the death of the other.43 
 
2. The Eleventh and Sixth Circuit: Application of the Prevailing Party 
Standard 
 
Although various courts of appeal have applied the prevailing 
party standard, this section will focus on two cases where the plaintiff 
received a favorable judgment on the merits yet was denied prevailing 
party status. In Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, the 
Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff that obtained an 
injunction against a potential employer had prevailed.44 The plaintiff, a 
job applicant, sued a potential employer claiming it discriminated 
against him based on a perceived disability and his age.45 The 
applicant also alleged that the employer administered a prohibited 
medical examination under the ADA to all job applicants, himself 
                                                 
39 Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam). 
40 Id. at 2. 
41 Id. at 3. 
42 Id. at 4. 
43 Id. 
44 Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1275-76 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
45 Id. at 1276. 
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included.46 Although the plaintiff lost on the disability and age 
discrimination claims, the court found that the ADA prohibited the 
employer’s medical examination and enjoined the employer from 
administering it in the future.47 Despite the receipt of an injunction, the 
district court ultimately denied plaintiff an award of attorney’s fees.48 
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the court’s denial of attorney’s fees 
because there was no material alteration in the relationship between 
the potential employer and the job applicant.49 Furthermore, it held 
that there was nothing in the record to suggest that Barnes received a 
benefit from the injunction as there was no indication that Barnes was 
reapplying, or likely to reapply, to the position he was denied.50 The 
court stated that the fact that the plaintiff may conceivably benefit 
from the injunction was insufficient to render him a prevailing party.51 
Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized that fee-shifting statutes 
enable plaintiffs to vindicate important constitutional and civil rights 
under the private attorney general theory, the court declared it was 
bound by the Supreme Court’s precedent requiring that the plaintiff 
receive some benefit from the judgment.52  
The Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of attorney’s fees to a 
wheelchair user who obtained an injunction ordering the City of 
Sandusky to comply with the certain provisions within the ADA.53 
Initially, the district court granted summary judgment to the city on all 
counts.54 Upon reconsideration, the district court vacated the summary 
judgment with regards to the ADA claim based on a subsequent 
decision from another judge in the same district, awarding injunctive 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1278. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1279 (stating that the court’s decision is “not intended to ignore or 
eviscerate the continuing viability of the ‘private attorney general’ cause of action”). 
53 Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2005). 
54 Id. at 566. 
10
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relief on the same ADA claim in a contemporaneous class action suit 
not involving Dillery.55 The Sixth Circuit held that the Dillery’s 
injunction did not benefit her at the time it was entered because the 
class action injunction essentially mooted her relief; therefore, the 
court found that Dillery was not a prevailing party.56 In dissent, Judge 
Merritt noted the bizarre nature of denying Dillery her attorney’s fees 
despite having filed suit before the class action on a nearly identical 
ADA claim based on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of one set of 
litigation progressing through the legal system at a faster pace than the 
other.57 
 
C. “The Only Reasonable Fee is Usually No Fee At All”58 
 
Even if a plaintiff receives a benefit from the judgment, the 
Supreme Court suggested that the benefit may be so technical or de 
minimis that a party can not be considered a prevailing party.59 
However, in a subsequent decision, the Court definitively stated that 
plaintiff’s degree of success did not bear on the inquiry of whether the 
plaintiff prevailed, but rather factored into what amount constituted a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.60 In Farrar v. Hobby, the Court addressed 
whether a plaintiff that sought seventeen million dollars in 
compensatory damages, while only receiving a dollar in nominal 
                                                 
55 Id. The complaint in the class action suit was filed after Dillery’s complaint; 
however, the class action progressed quicker through the legal system resulting in an 
injunctive order against the city before the Dillery’s injunctive order was entered. Id. 
at 571 (Merritt, J., dissenting).  
56 Id. at 569-70 (majority opinion). 
57 Id. at 571 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
58 U.S. v. Farrar, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992). 
59 Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Indp. School Dist., 489 U.S. 
782, 792 (1989) (“Beyond this absolute limitation, a technical victory may be so 
insignificant, and may be so near the situations addressed in Hewitt and Rhodes, as 
to be insufficient to support prevailing party status”). 
60 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (stating “[a]lthough the ‘technical’ nature of a . . . 
judgment does not affect the prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of 
fees awarded”).  
11
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damages, had prevailed.61 Although the Court characterized the 
nominal damages as merely a technical victory, the judgment 
materially altered the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant 
because the plaintiff benefited from the judgment; thus the plaintiff 
prevailed.62 
After a court determines that a plaintiff prevailed in the litigation, 
a court must then assess an award for reasonable attorney’s fees.63 The 
degree of success that the plaintiff obtained is the most critical factor 
in measuring the reasonableness of attorney’s fees awarded.64 The 
Farrar plaintiff had prevailed because he was awarded one dollar in 
nominal damages even though he sued for millions of dollars; 
however, the Court held that where a plaintiff recovers nominal 
damages, the “only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.”65 The 
Farrar holding indicated that a plaintiff that received nominal 
damages could be a prevailing party but would usually be denied any 
attorney’s fee under the reasonableness inquiry.66  
In her concurrence to Farrar, Justice O’Connor noted that 
“[n]ominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory make,” and 
outlined other considerations that should be weighed to determine 
whether a nominal judgment could justify an award of attorney’s 
fees.67 Nominal damages may be considered a victory in the sense that 
the judgment served to vindicate the plaintiff’s rights.68 Justice 
O’Connor outlined three factors that may bolster the amount of fees 
that a plaintiff could receive, after receiving a nominal judgment: (1) 
the significance of the legal issue, (2) the public purpose served, and 
(3) the extent of relief granted to plaintiff.69 Under the second factor, 
                                                 
61 Id. at 103. 
62 Id. at 112.  
63 Id. at 114. 
64 Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).  
65 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 122. 
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she noted that the fee-shifting provision ensures that individuals can 
vindicate important rights while recovering their attorney’s fees under 
a private attorney general theory.70 Justice O’Connor intimated that a 
judgment may serve a public purpose by deterring future unlawful 
conduct; however, she noted that Farrar’s one dollar judgment was 
insufficient to deter any misconduct.71 
 
II. KARRAKER V. RENT-A-CENTER, INC. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Steven Karraker, Michael Karraker, and Christopher Karraker 
worked at Rent-a-Center (RAC), and as a prerequisite to promotion, 
RAC required its employees to pass a management test administered 
by Associated Personnel Technicians (APT) called the APT 
Management Trainee-Executive Profile (management test).72 The 
management test consisted of a battery of nine separate written tests, 
one of which was the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI).73 The MMPI contained questions that measured certain 
personality traits; however, it also determined to what degree, if any, a 
person may possess traits such as depression, hypochondriasis, 
hysteria, paranoia, and mania.74 Any applicant whose score revealed 
                                                 
70 Id. (fee shifting provision in § 1988 is a “tool that ensures the vindication of 
important rights, even when large sums of money are not at stake, by making 
attorney’s fees available under a private attorney general theory”). 
71 Id. 
72 Karraker v. Rent-a-Center, Inc. (Karraker I), 411 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 
2005) 
73 Id. 
74 Id. The following true/false questions were examples of questions asked: 
I see things or animals or people around me that others do not see. 
My soul sometimes leaves my body. 
At one or more time in my life I felt that someone was making me 
do things by hypnotizing me. 
I have a habit of counting things that are not important such as 
bulbs on electric signs, and so forth. 
Id. at 833 n.1. 
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more than 12 “weighted deviations” throughout the entire management 
test would not be eligible for promotion.75 The Karrakers received 
more than 12 deviations on the management test and were denied 
promotion on that basis.76 Steven Karraker filed a class action lawsuit 
challenging his employer’s administration of a personality test and its 
consideration of the test results in promotion decisions.77 
 
B. District Court Opinions 
 
The district court initially granted summary judgment on most of 
Karrakers’ claims against RAC; however, upon remand from the 
Seventh Circuit, the district court entered a declaratory judgment in 
favor of Karraker, declaring the MMPI violated the ADA.78 The court 
also entered an injunction ordering RAC to search various offices for 
the MMPI results of Illinois employees and destroy them, as well as 
not consider them in promotion decisions.79 After the injunction was 
                                                 
75 Id. at 834. 
76 Karraker I, 411 F.3d at 834. 
77 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 897. 
78 See Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, 2005 WL 2001511, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 
2005). 
79 Id. at *4. The injunction ordered by the district court read, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
(2) Defendant RAC is ordered to make a diligent search of its 
Illinois stores, offices of district and regional managers with 
authority over stores in Illinois, corporate headquarters and storage 
facilities to find the results of the Management Test scores of 
Illinois RAC employees and narratives and any copies thereof and 
remove the Management Test scores and narratives for its Illinois 
employees from its Illinois stores, from its district and regional 
managers’ offices, from corporate headquarters and from storage. 
(3)  RAC is ordered to destroy the Management Test results and 
not consider the scores or narratives in making any employment 
decision for its Illinois employees. However, Plaintffs have ten 
days from the entry of this order to object to the destruction of 
documents if Plaintiffs feel they need access to these documents 
for the present litigation. RAC should not destroy any test results 
prior to ten days from entry of this order.  
14
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issued, Karraker petitioned the court for attorney’s fees, and in a later 
petition requested that the court award compensation for the named 
plaintiff, Steven Karraker.80 In the same opinion, the district court 
denied plaintiffs their attorney’s fees but granted the unopposed 
motion to set compensation for Steven Karraker as the named plaintiff 
in the class action.81 
Relying primarily on Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office,82 
the district court determined that the plaintiffs had not prevailed.83 
Based on the fact that RAC stopped administering the management 
test before the plaintiffs had filed the original complaint, the court held 
that plaintiff did not receive a benefit from the injunction but rather 
only obtained a judicial pronouncement that the RAC’s management 
test violated the ADA.84 Furthermore, the court held that the 
injunction’s mandate to destroy the management test results did not 
benefit the plaintiffs because the results were in a locked room, and 
the court found no indication that the results were either vulnerable to 
disclosure to third parties or that RAC continued considering them for 
promotions.85 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs’ success 
was de minimis and not enough to label them a prevailing party.86 
The court also noted that the defendants had failed to respond to 
the plaintiffs’ motion to set compensation at $5,000 for Steven 
Karraker.87 Since RAC did not object to the motion to set 
compensation for Steven Karraker, Judge McCuskey deemed the 
compensation amount of $5,000 to be reasonable and granted the 
motion.88 The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of attorney’s fees.89  
                                                 
80 Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, 431 F. Supp. 2d 883, 886-87 (C.D. Ill. 2006). 
81 Id. at 887. 
82 190 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1999). 
83 Karraker, 431 F.Supp.2d at 887. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Karraker v. Rent-A-Center (Karraker II), 492 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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C. The Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
On appeal for denial of attorney’s fees, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded the 
case for a determination of a reasonable amount of fees.90 The court 
started its analysis by only briefly mentioning the district court’s 
reliance on Barnes and then quickly turned its attention to Farrar v. 
Hobby.91 
RAC argued that although the plaintiffs received an enforceable 
injunction against it, the judgment did not provide plaintiffs with a 
tangible benefit because RAC stopped administering the management 
test in 2000 before the entire litigation began.92 RAC also argued that 
it did not employ any of the named plaintiffs at the time the injunction 
was entered, and it was unclear from the record whether any plaintiff 
in the certified class was working at RAC at that time.93 The 
destruction of the tests could not have benefited the plaintiffs because 
there was no evidence that RAC intended to disclose the records.94 
Despite RAC’s arguments that plaintiffs had not received a judgment 
that benefited them in any manner, the court resolved the “close 
question” in favor of the plaintiffs.95 
The majority reasoned that the injunction that the plaintiffs 
received was worth at least as much as the one dollar in nominal 
damages awarded to the plaintiff in Farrar.96 The court analyzed the 
three factors that Justice O’Connor laid out in her concurrence in 
Farrar, and it determined that the district court’s judgment had 
conferred on plaintiffs a valuable benefit by ordering the destruction of 
                                                 
90 Id. at 896. 
91 Id. at 898. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 898, 900. 
96 Id. at 898. 
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all the management tests and the narratives that were produced.97 
Before the injunction, there was nothing to prevent RAC from 
disclosing or carelessly allowing the dissemination of the exam results 
or the narratives to anyone else.98 Contrary to RAC’s assertion, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that the test results were not safely locked away 
because the record demonstrated that numerous test results were 
scattered throughout various stores and offices.99 It concluded by 
stating that the underlying judgment granting summary judgment to 
the plaintiffs had a significant impact on the law as well as on human 
resource departments across the nation, which refer to Karraker I for 
the proposition that an employer’s use of an MMPI violates that 
ADA.100 
In dictum, the court addressed what role compensation for the 
named plaintiff played in the prevailing party inquiry.101 RAC argued 
that the compensation awarded Steven Karraker was similar in nature 
to a litigation expense rather than a recovery of damages.102 The court 
distinguished every case that RAC cited for that proposition because 
none dealt with whether a compensation payment, or incentive fee 
award, conferred prevailing party status to the plaintiff.103 Ultimately, 
the court declined to address the issue because it found that the 
injunction alone was sufficient to prevail under the circumstances.104 
In his dissent, Judge Flaum disagreed from the majority as to 
whether the plaintiffs benefited from the injunction.105 He recognized 
that the issue in the case is whether the plaintiffs prevailed, that is to 
say whether any member of the plaintiff class obtained relief on the 
merits of a claim that directly benefited them at the time of the 
                                                 
97 Id. at 899. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 899-900. 
102 Id. at 899. 
103 Id. at 899-900. 
104 Id. at 900. 
105 Id. at 900 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
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judgment.106 Judge Flaum believed that the lower court erred in 
entering an injunction ordering RAC to search for and destroy the 
results of the management test because the plaintiffs failed to establish 
that they sustained or were in danger of experiencing a direct injury 
from their existence.107 With respect to the whether enjoining RAC 
from considering the test results in employment decisions benefited 
the plaintiffs, Judge Flaum noted that the record did not indicate 
whether any member of the plaintiff class had standing to challenge 
RAC’s continued use of the management test and its results.108 Judge 
Flaum recommended remanding the action to determine if any 
plaintiff had standing to challenge RAC’s consideration of the 
management test results when the district court issued the 
injunction.109 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding in light of the “Prevailing Party” 
Standard  
 
The prevailing party inquiry has endured a long and tortured—and 
more importantly unnecessary—history of judicial interpretation and 
application.  
In Karraker, the Seventh Circuit noted that whether the plaintiffs 
had prevailed was a “close question.”110 Given the breadth and 
vagueness of Supreme Court cases on the prevailing party standard, it 
is no wonder courts have trouble applying the elusive apparent 
standard. The Seventh Circuit noted that the destruction of the results 
of an improperly administered test was a valuable benefit to the 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 900-901. 
109 Id. at 901. A class member may have had standing if she failed the APT 
test, failed an alternate test used for promotion decisions, and worked at RAC on the 
date the lower court issued the injunction. Id. 
110 Id. at 898 (majority opinion). 
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plaintiffs, and without the injunction, nothing would prevent RAC 
from distributing the test results to others or negligently allowing their 
dissemination.111 The plaintiff class obtained a declaratory judgment 
and an injunction, each discussed in turn. 
The district court entered summary judgment on behalf of the 
plaintiffs declaring that the MMPI was a prohibited medical 
examination under the ADA.112 It is unclear whether the declaratory 
judgment alone would confer prevailing party status on the class 
members.113 The Supreme Court clearly stated that a plaintiff’s moral 
satisfaction derived from a court’s declaration that his rights were 
violated was not the “stuff of which legal victories are made.”114 In the 
present case, although the class received a final declaratory judgment, 
the only real benefit that the class received from the declaratory 
judgment was the moral satisfaction attributed to a court declaring that 
the plaintiffs’ rights had been violated.115 
Given that the declaratory judgment alone would not mean the 
class prevailed, the class needed, and actually obtained, something 
more: injunctive relief. The district court entered a two-fold injunction 
ordering RAC to search for the test results and narratives of Illinois 
employees and to destroy them as well as to stop considering them for 
any employment decisions.116 The majority correctly analyzes the 
injunction as the only relief plaintiffs received that could potentially 
                                                 
111 Id. at 899. 
112 Id. at 897-98. 
113 See Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., 98 F.3d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that, although plaintiff obtained a declaratory judgment declaring that the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been violated, plaintiff had not prevailed because 
he did not have an enforceable judgment against the defendant). 
114 Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 762 (1987). 
115 See Petersen v. Gibson, 372 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that, after 
the district court vacated an award of nominal damages, the plaintiff’s relief only 
consisted of a judicial statement that the plaintiff’s rights had been violated, which 
was insufficient to support prevailing party status). 
116 See supra note 79. As the majority notes, destroying the tests and the results 
would render the latter part of the injunction superfluous; therefore, the majority did 
not consider whether the order to RAC to stop considering the test scores meant the 
plaintiffs prevailed. Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 899, n.1. 
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satisfy the prevailing party standard.117 The majority noted that the 
class members received a valuable benefit from the destruction of the 
management test results.118 The court compared the value of the 
destruction of test results as great as the value of the dollar in nominal 
damages awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in Farrar.119  
However, as Judge Flaum noted in his dissent, the court does not 
explain how any member of the class actually received a benefit from 
the destruction of the test results.120 The court seems to rest its 
conclusion on the fact that, without the injunction, nothing would 
prevent RAC from disclosing or negligently disseminating the results 
of the tests to others.121 This justification seems to be at odds with 
Farrar, which held that there must be a direct benefit to the plaintiff at 
the time the judgment is entered.122 Plaintiffs did not establish that they 
obtained a victory that provided them a direct benefit at the time of 
judgment. Arguably, the class did not receive any benefit that it was 
not already enjoying before the court entered the injunction. The 
record demonstrated that the named plaintiffs were not even employed 
at RAC at the time of the judgment;123 therefore, enjoining RAC from 
considering the test results in promotion decisions and destroying the 
results would not directly benefit them. Therefore, the benefit for the 
named plaintiffs seems akin to the hypothetical benefit that the 
plaintiff in Barnes received, in that the Karrakers could only 
                                                 
117 Although the majority states in dictum that the compensation payment to 
the named plaintiff may have been enough to materially alter the relationship 
between the parties, Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 900, this Note does not consider 
whether the compensation payment would have conferred prevailing party status on 
Steven Karraker, the named plaintiff. 
118 Id. at 899. 
119 Id. at 898. 
120 Id. at 900-901 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. at 899 (majority opinion). 
122 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). 
123 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898. 
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conceivably benefit from the injunction if they were to regain 
employment with RAC and apply for a promotion.124  
Turning to the class members, it is not clear whether any class 
member benefited from the injunction because the record does not 
reveal whether any member was still employed with RAC at the time 
of judgment.125 Judge Flaum noted that RAC appeared to continue 
considering the results from the management test in promotion 
decisions;126 therefore, it is possible that a class member received a 
direct benefit from the injunction. A class member that took and failed 
the management test and was still employed at the time of the 
judgment may have benefited from the destruction of the test results 
when applying for promotions.127 The majority does not address 
whether the plaintiffs’ benefit was merely a conjectural benefit, or 
whether the class members were employed during the relevant time 
period. Instead, it analyzes the benefit derived from the injunction 
under Justice O’Connor’s framework in Farrar.128  
                                                 
124 See Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that although the job applicant could “conceivably benefit” from 
enjoining the potential employer from using a prohibited medical examination in its 
application process, that type of benefit was not adequate to render him a prevailing 
party). 
125 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898. Although RAC had ceased administering the 
management test before the plaintiff class received its injunction, it is not clear from 
the record whether RAC continued considering the test results when making 
promotion decisions. Id. at 900-01 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
126 Id. at 901. 
127 Id. (“there may have been a plaintiff who had standing to challenge RAC’s 
continued use of the APT test scores if he or she 1) failed the APT test, 2) did not 
pass the Future Choice Selection Process and did not complete any required 
Developmental Competencies, and 3) was still employed at RAC on the date that the 
district court issued the injunction”). 
128 Id. at 898-99 (majority opinion). Numerous courts of appeal have adopted 
the factors that Justice O’Connor lays out in her concurrence in Farrar to analyze 
whether an attorney fees should be awarded despite only a nominal victory. See, e.g., 
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. City of Onawa, 
323 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 2003); Brandau v. State of Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179, 1181 
(10th Cir. 1999); Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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The Farrar Court held that a plaintiff that receives nominal 
damages is a prevailing party; however, a reasonable attorney’s fee 
award to such a plaintiff is usually nothing at all.129 Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence set forth three factors that courts should 
consider to determine whether a victory of nominal damages could 
justify an award of attorney’s fees.130 The factors included the extent 
of plaintiff’s relief, the public purpose served, and the significance of 
the legal issue.131 Justice O’Connor clearly noted that these factors 
were relevant only to the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees.132 In 
Karraker II, the Seventh Circuit states that Justice O’Connor’s three 
factors weigh into the prevailing party inquiry, contrary to the 
language in her concurrence. 133 Thus, the Court applies the factors to 
the incorrect inquiry, and it concludes that plaintiffs received a 
valuable benefit, noting in particular that the Karraker I decision has 
had a significant public impact on human resources departments 
throughout the country.134 The majority’s misapplication of the 
O’Connor’s framework highlights the confusion surrounding the 
prevailing party inquiry in general, due in great part from Supreme 
Court precedent.  
Although the analysis did not conform formalistically to the 
Supreme Court precedent, the Seventh Circuit’s brief analysis into 
whether the class prevailed is justified. Given that the plaintiff class 
received an injunction as a result of succeeding on one of its claims, it 
seems almost a waste of the court’s time to analyze whether the class 
has prevailed. According to its definition, a “prevailing party” is “[a] 
party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount 
                                                 
129 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992). 
130 Id. at 122 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 117 (“[w]hile Garland may be read as indicating that this de minimis 
or technical victory exclusion is a second barrier to prevailing party status, the Court 
makes clear today that, in fact, it is part of the determination of what constitutes a 
reasonable fee”). 
133 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898-99.  
134 Id. at 899. 
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of damages awarded[.]”135 The plaintiffs received a favorable 
judgment, and according to the definition, that was sufficient to label 
them a prevailing party.136 Whether the injunction actually benefited 
the plaintiffs is an inquiry more directly linked to calculating a 
reasonable attorney’s fee, where the extent of a plaintiff’s success 
factors into the court’s calculation of a reasonable attorney’s fee.137 
The Supreme Court’s formalistic analysis as to whether a permanent 
injunction directly benefits a plaintiff at the time of judgment has 
required courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Karraker II, to engage 
in a needless analysis. The Supreme Court should end the confusion 
surrounding the prevailing party standard and apply a per se rule as 
discussed below. 
 
B. Proposed Per Se Rule for Prevailing Party Standard 
 
While Judge Flaum correctly noted that the majority did not 
identify a specific benefit that the plaintiffs received from the 
judgment,138 the Supreme Court should adopt a per se rule to avoid 
that inquiry altogether where a plaintiff has received a permanent 
injunction, as plaintiffs did in Karraker II. Adopting a per se rule 
would render the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, albeit brief, of whether 
the plaintiffs prevailed unnecessary. Where a plaintiff obtains a final, 
enforceable judgment against the defendant on the merits, such as a 
permanent injunction, the plaintiff should automatically be considered 
a “prevailing party” for purposes of the ADA fee-shifting statute, as 
well as all other consistently interpreted fee-shifting statutes.139 There 
are three reasons why the per se rule is a better option than the existing 
analysis: 1) the rule will be more efficient in resolving fee-shifting 
                                                 
135 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed. 2004). 
136 See Buckhannon Bd. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human 
Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (interpreting definition of “prevailing party” 
found  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed 1999) as consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s precedent). 
137 See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114.  
138 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 900 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
139 See supra notes 32-34. 
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litigation, 2) the rule is consistent with Congress’ private attorney 
general rationale underlying fee-shifting provisions in civil rights 
statutes, and 3) the per se rule is a logical and incremental extension of 
the current Supreme Court precedent deciding whether a plaintiff has 
prevailed. 
First, the per se rule will provide an incremental step in creating a 
more efficient judicial determination of whether attorney’s fees are 
warranted. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, Justice Brennan accurately 
characterized litigation disputing an award or denial of attorneys’ fees 
as “one of the least socially productive types of litigation imaginable,” 
in light of the fact that the merits of the case have already been 
decided.140 By automatically classifying a plaintiff as a prevailing 
party, the trial court will bypass one step in determining whether an 
award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff is appropriate, and it may then 
proceed to calculating a reasonable attorney fee. Under the proposed 
approach, a court would not have to undertake the task of determining 
whether a party received a direct benefit at the time of the judgment 
because it would be irrefutably presumed as such. After the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that plaintiffs had prevailed, it had to remand the 
case for a determination of reasonable attorney’s fees.141 Under the per 
se rule, the district court would have automatically classified the 
plaintiff class as a prevailing party, and proceed to  determine a 
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees, which may have still included no 
fee at all.142 
Second, although the Seventh Circuit does not emphasize this 
point, the ADA, and other civil rights statutes, included fee-shifting 
provisions to encourage private enforcement by means of private 
actions.143 A per se rule would encourage private litigants to vindicate 
                                                 
140 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
141 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 900. 
142 See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (stating that a court may find that the only 
reasonable attorney fee that should be awarded to a prevailing party is no fee at all).  
143 See Aleyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 
263 (1975) (stating that “Congress has opted to rely heavily on private enforcement 
to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage private 
litigation”). 
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important rights as private attorney generals because it would remove 
at least one obstacle to obtaining attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court 
only abrogated the private attorney general theory in circumstances 
where there was no fee-shifting statute.144 The theory still underpins 
the Congressional policy of fee-shifting provisions in civil rights 
statutes and could have contextualized and explained the true benefit 
the class obtained. The class challenged RAC’s policy requiring 
employees to pass the MMPI in order to be considered for promotions 
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would stop the 
practice.145 The class received that judgment, but as mentioned before, 
the record was unclear whether any of class members benefited from 
their judgment.146  
The plaintiff class in Karraker II brought suit, not only to 
challenge its employer’s conduct, but also to privately enforce the civil 
rights of others similarly situated, which it did as is evidenced by the 
numerous human resources publications in which Karraker I is 
cited.147 The class members provided a benefit to a class of people that 
extended beyond the members of the plaintiff class. The injunction’s 
effect did not only potentially benefit the plaintiff class, but also 
vindicated a right that Congress has assigned a high priority; 
eliminating discrimination in hiring and promoting decisions pursuant 
to the ADA.148 Given that plaintiffs’ judgment helped privately enforce 
a law that benefits the public as a whole, the plaintiff class, in effect, 
fulfilled the purpose of the statute and achieved a significant victory. 
Under the per se rule, the plaintiffs in Dillery v. City of 
Sandusky149 and Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office150 would 
                                                 
144 See id. 
145 Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, 2005 WL 2001511, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 
2005).  
146 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 901 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
147 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 899 (majority opinion). 
148 See Bruce v. City of Gainesville, 177 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that enforcement of the ADA by private plaintiffs acting as private attorney 
generals is a significant component underlying the law’s policy). 
149 398 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2005). 
150 190 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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not have necessarily been denied an award of attorney’s fees. The 
plaintiffs in both cases obtained injunctive relief; however, in both 
cases, the court determined that their injunction had not bestowed 
upon them a direct benefit sufficient to convey prevailing party 
status.151 However, if they had been classified as prevailing parties, the 
courts would likely have engaged in determining whether their 
otherwise technical victory justified an award of attorney’s fees under 
Justice O’Connor’s three factor framework.152 Allowing civil rights 
plaintiffs reach Justice O’Connor’s framework serves the private 
attorney general theory because her framework considers the impact 
the injunction had on the public, an underlying premise of the private 
attorney general theory. The per se rule is consistent with the 
Congressional policy of encouraging private enforcement, and it is a 
significant reason why the Court should be willing to give more 
leeway to a plaintiff acting as a private attorney general when 
determining prevailing party status. 
Third, the per se rule is consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
analyzing the prevailing party standard. For instance, the Court has 
implicitly held that the benefit to the plaintiff is a factor that should be 
considered in determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s 
fees.153 The Supreme Court has already held that the degree of success 
is critical in the reasonableness inquiry,154 and whether a judgment 
benefits a plaintiff is an inquiry subsumed by considering the degree 
of success factor. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s has already 
                                                 
151 The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff in Dillery did not receive any relief 
from her injunction because an identical injunction had recently been issued by 
another court in the same district to a distinct class of plaintiffs. 398 F.3d at 569. In 
Barnes, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff, a job applicant, had not received 
a benefit from an injunction ordering the employer to cease using a certain medical 
examination because there was no indication that the plaintiff was going to, or likely 
to, reapply to the position he was denied. 190 F.3d at 1278. 
152 The courts would have had to analyze the extent of relief the plaintiffs 
received, the significance of the legal issue they prevailed on, and the public purpose 
served by the injunction. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 122 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) 
153 See id. at 114 (majority opinion). 
154 Id. 
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applied a per se rule in the prevailing party inquiry with regards to 
nominal damages.155 Extending the per se rule to plaintiffs that have 
obtained a permanent injunction is a logical and incremental step in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The Seventh Circuit stated in 
Karraker II, the value of the Karrakers’ injunction was worth as much 
as the one dollar of nominal damages awarded to the plaintiff in 
Farrar.156 The majority’s perspective on the value of the plaintiffs’ 
injunction seems to flow logically in light of the holding in Farrar. 
For all the reasons above, the plaintiffs in Karraker should have been 
automatically considered prevailing parties. 
One major drawback to the per se rule is that attorneys may file 
meritless claims on behalf of civil rights plaintiffs for the sole purpose 
of recovering attorney’s fees. That danger is effectively curtailed by 
the doctrine of standing and the Supreme Court’s decision in Farrar. 
Standing will prevent plaintiffs that cannot show actual injury to 
themselves, rather than society as a whole, from filing suit in the first 
place. And even though a civil rights plaintiff may obtain prevailing 
party status more readily, the plaintiff must still show that his 
judgment was not of the type which warrants a reasonable attorney fee 
award of zero. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit ultimately held correctly that the plaintiff 
class should be considered a prevailing party for purposes of awarded 
attorney’s fees. The majority’s analysis of whether the class had 
prevailed was required by the Supreme Court’s formulation of the 
prevailing party standard. However, given the fact that the class had 
obtained a permanent injunction, it is an unnecessary waste of time for 
courts to engage in such analysis. The Supreme Court should adopt a 
per se rule that would automatically convey prevailing party status to 
plaintiffs, such as the class in Karraker, because it is more efficient 
                                                 
155 Id. at 112 (“We therefore hold that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is 
a prevailing party under § 1988”). 
156 Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898. 
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and fits into the Congress’ private attorney general rationale 
underpinning its fee-shifting provisions in civil rights legislation. The 
rule also is an incremental and logical extension of the Supreme 
Court’s per se rule that a plaintiff that receives nominal damages is a 
prevailing party. Therefore, the Supreme Court should adopt a per se 
rule that confers prevailing party status to a civil rights plaintiff that 
obtains a permanent injunction. 
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